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Family firm configurations for high performance: 
The role of entrepreneurship and ambidexterity 
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Hughes, M./Filser, M./Harms, R./Kraus, S./Chang, M./Cheng, C.-F. (2018): Family firm 
configurations for high performance: The role of entrepreneurship and ambidexterity, British 
Journal of Management, vol. 29, no. 4, 595-612. 
 
The performance drivers of family firms have spawned considerable research interest. Almost 
exclusively this research has relied on independent sets of explanatory variables in linear 
analyses. These analyses mask the complex interdependencies that are likely to exist among 
key success factors, leading to faulty theory and misspecified implications for practice. As 
treatment, we propose a configuration approach to family firm performance that accounts for 
complex interdependencies among entrepreneurial, innovation and family influence 
conditions. Using a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of a sample of 129 
Finnish family firms, we identify sufficient conditions with regards to the existence or 
absence of antecedent conditions to family firm performance. These conditions include 
entrepreneurial orientation, exploration and exploitation activities that form causal paths 
towards family firm performance. To enrich our analysis, we theorize and empirically analyse 
how these conditions might differ in family firms with high and low levels of family 
influence. We deepen the current understanding of configurations that promote the 
performance of family firms, offer important implications for theory and practice, and set new 
directions for future research on the strategic management of family firms. Our results are 
also virtually identical and insensitive to change across subjective and objective performance 
measures. 
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Introduction 
Family-specific conditions “allow many family businesses not only to reap advantages of 
continuity and focus (“exploitation”), but also to reorient themselves when needed 
(“exploration”)” (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2006, p. 215). This suggests that high-
performing family firms tend to innovate based on exploitation and exploration, known as 
‘ambidexterity’ (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; He and Wong, 2004; O’Reilly and Tushman, 
2013). Literature suggests a positive relationship between ambidexterity and firm 
performance (Allison et al., 2014; Moss et al., 2014). Yet we know little about how 
ambidexterity configures with other organizational factors to influence firm performance 
(Stettner and Lavie, 2014), particularly when the firm’s context is atypical to that of 
traditional, large public and private firms that dominate the current literature (Chang and 
Hughes, 2012; Hughes et al., 2010). We propose that exploration and exploitation alone, and 
various combinations thereof, together with additional dimensions, can be antecedents to 
family firm performance (Junni et al., 2013). Neglecting such dimensions would result in an 
incomplete treatise with inadequate predictive capacities. This problem is exacerbated by 
investigations that study only the individual effects of such conditions. To overcome this, 
thought must be given to how these conditions configure together for firm performance. 
Not all family firms may enjoy the same success in exploration and exploitation 
(Sharma and Salvato, 2011). Performance differences may be due to different realizations of 
the family context, leading to agency problems (Carney, 2005) and different emphasis on the 
nonfinancial objectives that shape family firm strategy (Berrone et al., 2012; Frank et al., 
2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). This is a product of family influence, or ‘familiness’, a 
resource unique to a family firm because of the interactions between the family, its individual 
members, and the business (Habbershon, 1999). Familiness brings forth a family business 
identity that has grown historically and can alter the firm’s ability to innovate (Frank et al., 
2010). Specifically, greater family influence can lead to strategies not conducive to 
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entrepreneurship or performance unless systematically mitigated (Carney, 2005). As such, a 
linear analysis of factors antecedent to family firm performance risks understating patterns of 
interdependencies and particularly when accounting for the context of each family firm (by 
way of their degree of familiness). Instead, a configuration of factors might be at play in 
explaining the success of high-performing family firms beyond just the presence of 
exploration or exploitation. Family firm literature points to not only family influence but also 
entrepreneurial orientation (EO) as further components of such a configuration.  
EO is a strategic orientation comprised of risk-taking, innovativeness, and proactiveness 
(Covin and Slevin, 1989; Miller, 1983). Family firm researchers have linked EO to superior 
performance (Craig et al., 2014; Cruz and Nordquist, 2012). However, scholars also report 
that family influence can compromise EO by diminishing the appetite for risk-taking, 
prioritizing the family’s financial and social well-being (Naldi et al., 2007), parochial interests 
(Miller et al., 2015) and their desire to maintain and protect control over the business (Carney, 
2005). The theoretical background of these findings appears to be grounded in agency logic 
and principles associated with the preservation of family influence. 
This collective ambiguity surrounding the composition of exploration, exploitation and 
EO as likely drivers of performance in family firms indicates that a non-traditional approach 
is necessary to analyse their relationship more effectively. We use a configuration analysis 
grounded in fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to resolve this ambiguity by 
categorizing these performance antecedents into groups of family firms that exhibit high and 
low levels of family influence. Our research question is: What are the sufficient 
configurations of antecedents (EO, exploration and exploitation, and family influence) to 
family firm performance?  
This study offers three contributions. First, we use configuration theory and draw 
together expectations from agency and socioemotional wealth theories of family firms to set 
out new propositions about configurations of family firms’ EO, exploration and exploitation 
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activities and how these might contribute to family firm performance under high and low 
levels of family influence. We contribute to theory by revealing the unexpected 
substitutability of EO and exploration, the primacy of adaptive theory to explain 
configurations and its use in explaining family firm performance in ways agency and 
socioemotional logics fail to do, and reveal the local character of configurations of family 
firm performance and when specialization might be better to ambidexterity. Second, the study 
offers an empirical contribution by providing new data on specific configurations of 
exploration and exploitation, EO, and family influence as causal conditions that yield high 
performance for family firms. Finally, the study offers a further empirical contribution by 
extending the fsQCA method into the family firm literature, illustrating how quantitative data 
on family firms can be converted by Boolean algebra to facilitate more nuanced empirical 
analysis than is available through more traditional quantitative methods (Ragin, 2000; 
Woodside, 2010a; 2010b). The power of this approach lies in its ability to determine 
sufficient conditions within several causal paths (configurations) that elicit a desired outcome. 
As a general contribution, we evidence that fsQCA results are robust across subjective and 
objective performance measures to increase scholars’ and managers’ confidence in fsQCA 
results. 
 
The configurational nature of family firm performance 
We first illustrate the performance impact of EO and then argue that performance is driven by 
configurations of EO and exploration and exploitation activities. We following this with 
arguments that that well-performing configurations differ between family firms with a high 
versus low degree of family influence (or familiness): increasing family influence changes the 
circumstances at play inside the firm (Frank et al., 2010), thereby causing it to require 
different recipes for high performance.  
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A configuration is a model of a firm that “contains relationships among elements or 
items representing multiple domains” (Dess et al., 1993, p. 776). By modelling a firm with 
multiple domains simultaneously, we can build more detailed models and move beyond 
bivariate “success factor” research (Harms et al., 2009; Kraus et al., 2017). In configurations, 
elements are embedded in a web of relationships with others, often creating complex 
relationships. 
Traditionally, the strategic orientation literature (Venkatraman, 1989; Hakala, 2011) 
posits that a strategic orientation is a general pattern of various means; an antecedent to 
achieve business goals that ultimately impacts performance. In particular, EO impacts 
exploration and exploitation, which leads to family firm performance. Drawing on the basic 
framework from Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004, p. 210), which asserts that a firm’s context 
influences the relative value of exploration and exploitation activities to firm performance, 
familiness and EO are regarded as antecedents to, and family firm performance as a 
consequence of, ambidexterity (see Figure 1). 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
However, in line with configuration theory and based on fsQCA logic, we propose that 
EO, exploration and exploitation are combined in a set of conditions for family firm 
performance (see Figure 2). The circles of the Venn diagram illustrate conditions that, in 
isolation or in combination (overlap), may lead to family firm performance.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
EO and Performance 
EO reflects a proclivity towards organizational processes, methods and decision-making 
styles that managers use to act entrepreneurially (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). In doing so, the 
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firm exhibits a propensity to engage in (1) risk-taking, (2) innovativeness, and (3) proactive 
initiatives (Covin and Slevin, 1989). Risk-taking is the degree to which the firm (usually 
through its senior managers) is willing to try out new or different ideas by making resource 
commitments to projects with uncertain outcomes that bear a danger of costly failure. 
Innovativeness is a willingness and tendency to engage in, develop, and support new ideas, 
novelty, experimentation, and creative processes that may bring about new or adapted 
product, process, administrative, or technological outcomes (Semrau et al., 2016). 
Proactiveness is a forward-looking approach to running the business in which the firm seeks 
to pre-empt and act in advance of opportunities and threats (Hughes and Morgan, 2007; 
Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Miller, 1983). We adopt the Miller (1983) and Covin and Slevin 
(1989) position that a firm must exhibit all three dimension to ultimately possess an EO.  
The literature supports a positive effect by EO on firm performance. For example, 
Rauch et al.’s (2009) meta-analysis found a moderately large and robust correlation with 
performance (r =.242), but there is still a lot of unexplained variance. The interpretation of 
this can be that EO can be an ingredient of successful firms, but does not have to be one. 
Previous research on EO-performance configurations give support to this interpretation in that 
both Lisboa et al. (2016) and Linton & Kask (2017) found high-performance configurations 
that do not include EO, while Hughes et al. (2007) find that the promise of EO for firm 
performance may depend on its configuration with additional factors. This literature also 
points towards and for family firms, Naldi et al. (2007) suggest that they often exhibit lower 
levels of EO as they prioritise organizational and social well-being not just financial 
performance. 
To explain these findings, we draw on the dispositional perspective of EO. Under this 
perspective EO illustrates the propensity of firms toward entrepreneurship, but does not 
reflect entrepreneurial action per se (Anderson and Covin, 2014). Ultimately it is 
entrepreneurial action such as exploration and exploitation (and not unrealized propensity) 
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that leads to performance. This is particularly so for family firms as a study by Wright et al. 
(2016) into UK family firms found that while family firms reported a strong orientation 
towards creativity, innovating new products and proactively initiating change, their actual 
investments in high-risk projects was much lower. A test of disposition versus behaviour 
perspective could entail mediation analyses in which EO is conceptualized as a propensity, 
and a behavioural mediator shapes its effects on performance. A recent overview of EO-
mediator studies found at least partial mediation of the EO-performance relationship (Harms, 
2013). The notion that additional ingredients are needed in any organizational recipe that 
translates EO into firm performance is one that has emerged as a research priority since Rauch 
et al.’s (2009) meta-analysis. This is best illustrated in works calling on scholars to 
disentangle its wider system of effects and dependencies (Wales, 2016; Wales et al., 2011). In 
the language of fsQCA then, the theoretical background that draws on the dispositional 
perspective of EO as well as the empirical evidence described above point towards the 
assumption that EO can, but does not have to be related to firm performance. In and of itself 
then, EO may not present a sole sufficient condition for family firm performance. Thus: 
Proposition 1: EO can be an element of family firm performance, but is not a 
sufficient component on its own. 
 
Ambidexterity and Performance 
Exploration implies processes engaging the firm in search, discovery, experimentation, and 
variation to generate new products (Kyriakopoulos and Moorman, 2004; March, 1991). 
Exploitation implies processes that engage the firm in productivity, refinement and efficiency 
that reduce variance so as to adapt, extend, and gradually improve existing products (He and 
Wong, 2004). Ambidexterity theory holds that firms that excel in both exploration and 
exploitation achieve superior performance (Cao et al., 2009; Junni et al., 2013; O’Reilly and 
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Tushman, 2013), since failure to do so risks trapping the firm in a suboptimal state in which it 
neither innovates for the future nor refines its existing offerings (March, 1991). 
We argue that if EO may be dispositional, exploration, exploitation and ambidexterity 
may be behavioural and thus more immediately linked to performance. For example, 
Lumpkin and Dess (2001) argue that EO is not only linked to (exploratory) product market 
innovations, but also to (exploitative) innovations in the fields of technology and operations 
(Kollmann and Stöckmann, 2014). Ireland and Webb (2007, p. 50) further argue that EO is 
likened also to ambidexterity in that EO balances “between opportunity seeking (i.e. 
exploration) and advantage-seeking (i.e. exploitation) behaviors”.  
Prevailing empirical evidence suggest that exploitation, exploration, and combinations 
thereof are related to a large variety of performance indicators (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013). 
This is supported by the meta-analysis of Junni et al. (2013), who found effect sizes of .26 for 
both exploration and exploitation, and of about .45 for ambidexterity. Still, there may be 
contextual influences on these relationships. Exploration and exploitation are resource 
intensive which is why balancing both dimensions might be better than efforts to excel at both 
(Cao et al., 2009; March, 1991), both exploration and exploitation can have their own 
individual effects as well (Auh and Menguc, 2005), and evidence of the context sensitivity of 
ambidexterity (e.g., to resource availability, size and age of the firm) exists (Chang and 
Hughes, 2012; Menguc and Auh, 2008; Voss and Voss, 2013). For family firms, we know 
very little about ambidexterity De Massis et al., 2013a but suspect that their longer-term 
perspective may favour exploration while in the short term their general conservative and 
cautious behaviour to preserve family wealth may orient towards exploitation (Carney, 2005; 
Wright et al., 2016). 
In summary, while general evidence points towards a significant relationship, we 
propose the following: 
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Proposition 2: Exploration, exploitation, or ambidexterity can be elements of family 
firm performance, but are not a sufficient component on their own. 
 
Linking EO, Ambidexterity and Performance 
Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence point to relationships between EO, exploration, 
exploitation, ambidexterity and performance. Yet, previous studies (that were mainly based 
on regression logic) do not suggest how these come together to form sufficient conditions (in 
configurational comparative logic). We expect that the key constructs will form multiple 
configurations combining at least two conditions. EO, exploration and exploitation may be 
“insufficient but nonredundant parts of different configurations which are themselves 
unnecessary but sufficient for the occurrence” (Jacobs et al., 2016, p.9) of family firm 
performance.  
The possibility that the functioning and effects of EO relies on its configuration with 
and without other organizational conditions was put forward by Hughes et al. (2007). In their 
paper, using the more traditional regression-based form of configuration analysis, these 
authors found that EO (described as a form of exploration) clashed with exploitative learning 
(a form of exploitation) such that firms cannot sustain both. These authors also reported that 
the effects of EO were particularly strong for those firms whose exploitative learning was 
weak. This speaks to March’s (1991) concern that exploration- and exploitation-type activities 
exhibit a trade-off although it is against beliefs elsewhere in this literature that the two are 
independent (Cao et al., 2009). Hughes et al (2007) studied young, resource-constrained firms 
and Voss et al. (2013) in a study of SMEs found that as resource constraints are alleviated, 
SMEs tend to shift attention from exploitation to exploration. There are only two empirical 
QCA papers on EO and ambidexterity to date and these lend provisional support to their 
configurational nature but also highlight inconsistency. For example, Lisboa et al. (2016) find 
four types of well-performing firms (two with EO elements, exploration and exploitation 
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present; one with only risk-taking present and other constructs absent; and one with 
proactiveness and ambidexterity present and with innovativeness and risk-taking absent). 
Jacobs et al. (2016) find, among others, four types of well-performing configurations (one 
with EO, exploration and exploitation present; one with EO and exploitation present and 
exploration absent; one with EO and exploration present and exploitation absent; and one with 
exploration present and exploitation absent). 
Theory points to the configurational nature of EO, exploration, and exploitation, but at 
the same time there is uncertainty in how they may organize into configurations of high firm 
performance, and particularly when accounting for the nature of the firm of interest (a feature 
caused by the local character of adaptation; March, 2006). Thus: 
Proposition 3: EO, exploration, exploitation, and ambidexterity can form multiple 
configurations for the occurrence of family firm performance. It is expected that 
these conditions are insufficient but nonredundant parts of different configurations 
which are themselves unnecessary but sufficient for the occurrence of family firm 
performance. 
 
Family Influence and Configurations of EO, Exploration and Exploitation  
Family firms exhibit specific behaviour (De Massis et al., 2014b) due to family influence. 
Through power, experience and control over the functioning, direction and culture of the 
family firm (known as F-PEC, Astrachan et al., 2002), families impact firm strategy in 
general and innovation strategy in particular (Frank et al., 2010). Miller et al. (2015) suggest 
that familiness and its influence is one reason why some family firms appear to strive to 
create a strong business they can pass on to the next generation (resulting in innovation-
promoting resources forming in the firm), while others cater heavily to family desires for 
nepotistic appointments, generosity towards often undeserving kin, and appropriation of firm 
assets to fulfil parochial desires, which deplete or prevent innovation resources form forming. 
12 
 
Both agency consideration and non-financial wealth considerations stand out (Carney, 2005; 
De Massis et al., 2013b). Thus, variations in family influence have the potential to reconfigure 
exploration, exploitation and entrepreneurship. 
Agency theory suggests that families exhibit strong control over their firm’s strategic 
activities (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Shanker and Astrachan, 1996), which includes EO and 
exploration and exploitation (Short et al., 2009). Ownership and control are not separate in 
family firms. The controlling owner or family has considerable power over assets and 
resources and their allocation (Carney, 2005). It can minimize opportunism (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003), but result in greater authoritarianism, centralization, and high monitoring with 
little delegation (Dyer and Handler, 1994).  
Carney (2005) identified family influence as a defining characteristic of its governance 
in comparison to nonfamily firms. With no separation of ownership and control in family 
firms, their governance exhibits ‘parsimony’ (a frugality caused by strategic decisions being 
tied to the family’s personal wealth), ‘personalism’ (the concentration of authority into the 
hands of family managers) and ‘particularism’ (where the family sees the business as an 
extension of themselves leading to decision-making that is particular rather than economically 
rational). Particularism is important because it is reflected in the priority given to 
socioemotional wealth (SEW) such that strategic decisions became oriented towards 
preserving or growing that wealth over and above their financial value (Berrone et al., 2012; 
Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).  
Family influence can personalise the identity of the family firm but it is not inevitable 
that its strategic orientation becomes so control oriented. Strategic decisions are made with 
the family’s personal wealth and incentives exist to grow that wealth, despite the fact that 
under agency theory an incentive exists to minimize costs (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and 
monitor managers (as agents of the family) to prevent diversion of resources to activities that 
might be perceived to compromise wealth or put it at risk (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). This 
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‘personalism’, underpinning the influence of family owner-managers, means that family 
agents operate under fewer internal constraints and have latitude to implement practices that 
innovate to increased family wealth (Carney, 2005).  
Family firms are concerned with much more than just financial wealth. They prioritize 
nonfinancial, SEW and a bias to protect and grow SEW directly informs their strategic actions 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Cesinger et al., 2016). Family control and influence reflect two 
aspects of a family firm’s stock of SEW (Zellweger et al., 2012). Family firms are expected to 
exhibit different patterns of strategic activity (such as their emphasis on EO, exploration and 
exploitation) depending on their desire to sustain family control and influence (Berrone et al., 
2012). Short et al. (2009) observe that in the family firm the risk-taking and proactiveness 
dimensions of EO are lower than in nonfamily firms but innovativeness is not. They do 
exhibit entrepreneurial tendencies, with a particular emphasis on innovation. 
Exploration, exploitation or both, have the potential to affect family firms’ performance. 
Exploration and exploitation are unlikely to be the sole drivers of performance because from 
both agency and SEW theoretical perspectives, EO and family influence are meaningful to 
how family owners might exercise their authority and degrees of freedom to generate wealth. 
This indicates that relying on independent sets of explanatory variables in linear analyses 
mask the complex interdependencies that are likely to exist among key success factors. 
Neglecting how relevant factors might differ when placed in a configuration of all such 
variables may lead to faulty theory and wrong implications for practice. 
This is not to say that all family firms are then the same. We deduce that family 
influence plays a significant role in shaping EO, exploration, and exploitation configurations. 
These configurations may differ between family firms with a low degree of family influence 
and those with a high degree of family firm influence. Control over strategic decisions is 
mainly due to ownership and ownership in the family context is the sine-qua-non condition to 
exceed any other influence on strategic decisions. We propose there is an impact of family 
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influence on configurations involving EO and might explain the mixed support for EO found 
among studies of family firms (Casillas and Moreno, 2010; De Massis et al., 2014a; De 
Massis et al., 2013b; Martin and Lumpkin, 2004; Melin and Nordqvist, 2007; Zellweger and 
Sieger, 2012). In line with this debate, it has been suggested that a major economic goal of 
family firms is to develop high-quality, innovative and sellable products that will help grow 
the firm (Tagiuri and Davis, 1992). This suggests that family firm managers will pursue 
exploration activities to facilitate product development and exploitation activities to use 
current and future products to increase the sales and growth of the firm. This observation was 
captured in the conceptual work of Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006) who argue for the 
potential advantages of exploration and exploitation for family firms. Early empirical studies 
have again pointed towards the degree of family influence as a relevant factor for exploration 
respectively exploitation. A high F-PEC seems to be one of the factors that lead to a higher 
level of ambidexterity (Stubner et al., 2012), especially through family power and cultural 
alignment between family and firm interests, and higher levels of innovation in turn, to better 
financial performance. Nevertheless, Moss et al. (2014) highlight that family firms are rather 
heterogeneous, which lends further credence to the idea that exploration and exploitation at 
best only explain a part of the configuration of causal models that exist among comparable 
cases (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009). 
The literature has treated the impact of family influence on EO and exploration and 
exploitation activities separately. We see current empirical results pointing to an influence of 
family influence in these contexts but foresee that configurations of EO and exploration and 
exploitation across groups of family firms that exhibit high and low levels of family influence 
will emerge and be quite different to each other. Fundamentally, we expect that the sufficient 
conditions surrounding configurations of EO, exploration and exploitation associated with 
firm performance will (1) not be the same across groups of family firms exhibiting high and 
low levels of family finance and (2) that more than one route to performance (by way of more 
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than one configuration of these conditions) will exist. We now move to discuss our research 
methodology prior to an analysis of our empirically derived configurations. Thus: 
Proposition 4: Configurations for high family firm performance will differ between 
groups of low versus high family influence. 
 
Methodology 
Sample 
The sample is composed of 348 firms that were listed in the membership list of the Finnish 
Family Firms Association, the largest network of family firms in Finland. Membership 
criteria are that the majority of voting rights are in the hand of one family and that at least one 
family member is involved in the firm`s management or administration. Based on these 
membership criteria, these firms qualify as family firms (Miller et al., 2007). We further 
required firms to be older than 6 years to show a certain level of maturity and to recognize the 
time lags between innovation and their financial returns (Kraus et al., 2008). Ultimately, the 
family firms in our sample had an average age of 53.06 years with a standard deviation of 
28.892. The majority of our family firms are now in their second generation, with the second 
generation accounting for 52.7%, 57.4% and 55.8% of the ownership of the family firm, 
active in its top management team and active on the board of directors, respectively. 
Respondents were required to be a member of the owner family to ensure valid responses to 
questions about strategic and financial matters (John and Reve, 1982). 
After sending out the online questionnaire twice in 2013 we received 129 fully 
completed responses, a response rate of 37.07%. This compares favourably to other studies of 
Finnish family firms Makkonen et al., 2014, and particularly well to online surveys in general. 
Analyses of nonresponse bias (Rogelberg and Stanton, 2007) did not reveal and issues. The 
sample demographics (see Table 1) are not significantly different from the Finnish Family 
Firms Association in general. 
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A summary of main characteristics (Table 1) shows that the majority ownership of each 
individual business is in family hands. Most of the family firms are private liability SMEs. 
The firms primarily operate in manufacturing, wholesale and retail. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
Operationalization 
To measure family firm performance, we follow previous research and use sales growth, profit 
growth, and market share growth (Cronbach alpha [α] .88). These are among the most 
commonly used measures of success in entrepreneurship research (Carton and Hofer, 2006; 
Davidsson et al., 2009). To test the robustness of our results, we also use secondary 
performance data derived from the ORBIS database, which comprises the growth of a fmaily 
firm’s profit relative to mean growth in the sector (see Figure 3) on the assumption that 
relative growth captures the central idea of high performance (Makkonen et al., 2014). The 
measure of objective profit growth reflects an average score of three lapses of time and (2011-
2014; 2012-2014; 2013-2014). 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
To measure family influence, we use the F-PEC scale by Astrachan et al. (2002). It 
comprises three items for measuring power (α .75), three items for measuring experience (α 
.94), and eleven items for measuring culture (α .88).  
To assess exploration and exploitation, we used the scales of Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling 
and Veiga (2006) that measure exploration (α .79) and exploitation (α .85) with six items 
each. To measure EO we use the items for the three-dimensional representation of EO by 
Eggers et al. (2013), who developed and validated an alternative operationalization of EO 
suitable for SMEs by adapting items from the established EO scales of Miller (1983) and 
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Covin and Slevin (1988; 1986) and excluding items that focused only on large or larger firms 
(Sciascia et al., 2006; Roskos and Klandt, 2007). Five items each measure innovativeness (α 
.80) and proactiveness (α.78), and four items measure risk-taking (α.79). 
All items were scored using a 5-point Likert-type scale, with higher scores indicating 
higher levels of agreement on the item in question. The survey was subjected to double-blind 
translation to improve the validity and reliability of the measurement instruments (Brislin, 
1980).  
 
Method of analysis 
fsQCA is a normative model of set-theoretic connections and is applied as an analytical tool 
in social sciences. Since several problems of social science can be formulated in terms of sets 
and set relations (Ragin, 2008a), in which high values of a causal statement are not 
necessarily sufficient for high values of a dependent variable to occur (Woodside, 2013), the 
fsQCA method can identify these asymmetric relationships. It has been applied throughout 
management and innovation research to test set-theoretic relationships in social science 
models (Aversa et al., 2015; Bell et al., 2014; Brenes et al., 2017; Chang and Cheng, 2014; 
Cheng et al., 2013; Woodside, 2013).  
Unlike linear analytical methods such as regression, fsQCA establishes logical 
connections between combinations of causal conditions and an outcome at the same time, the 
result being a set of configurations that summarize the sufficiency between subsets of all of 
the possible combinations of the conditions and the outcome (Mendel and Korjani, 2012). 
fsQCA therefore focuses on identifying several (not just a single) combinations of conditions 
explanatory factors that are sufficient elicit a particular outcome (Bell et al., 2014; Chang and 
Cheng, 2014). The only article within family firm research using fsQCA so far (Garcia-Castro 
and Casasola, 2011) identifies different configurations of family firms on the basis of four 
components of family involvement, namely ownership, governance, management, and 
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succession. But, we use the method to probe inside our sample of family firms to determine 
combinations of EO, exploration and exploitation that elicit high performance in groups 
defined by their high or low levels of family influence. 
Following fsQCA best practice (Ragin, 2008b; Schneider and Wagemann, 2010), we 
examine for the configurations for achieving high performance for two groups (that is, high F-
PEC and low F-PEC) step-by–step. The first step is to transform the data into fuzzy sets 
(Ragin, 2008a; 2009; Woodside, 2013). To transform our constructs into ‘fuzzy scores’, it is 
necessary to calibrate them from interval scales to membership scores ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. 
The process of calibrating variables requires to specify the values of an interval-scale variable 
that correspond to full membership (95%), cross-over anchors (50%), and full non-
membership (5%), which are three qualitative breakpoints structuring a fuzzy set. Following 
prior work using fsQCA to study social sciences, this study set the original values of 5.0 and 
1.0 from the five-point Likert scales to correspond to full membership and full non-
membership for all variables, except for objective performance. The default of fsQCA 
neglects the cases with a membership of 0.50, because this membership is the crossover that 
cannot indicate the presence or absence of the condition. Normally, many cases responded the 
values of 3.0. For avoiding neglecting too many cases, we calibrated values of 2.99 as a 
membership of 0.50 for avoiding variables being dropped during the analysis (Frazier et al., 
2016). In terms of calibration of objective performance, values at 5, 50, and 95 percentiles 
served as the threshold for three memberships (Fiss, 2011).  
The second step is to construct the truth table (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010), which 
lists the logically possible combinations of conditions, by specifying the number-of-cases 
threshold as 1 and the consistent cut-off value as .80. These two thresholds are used to 
recognize configurations that are sufficient to the outcome from those that are not.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
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The third step is the construction of the ‘solution’. A ‘complex’ solution (in which no 
logical remainders, or zero cases, are used), a ‘parsimonious’ solution (in which all logical 
remainders may be used), and an ‘intermediate’ solution (in which partial logical remainders 
are incorporated into the solution so long as they are theoretically sensible) are three solutions 
produced for each analysis (Ragin, 2008b). Intermediate solutions are superior to both the 
complex and parsimonious solutions because they will not allow removal of necessary 
conditions (Ragin, 2009). Thus, we selected the intermediate solution. 
 
Results 
Before conducting fsQCA, we split the sample firms into two groups according to their F-
PEC summated scores to compare the results across different levels of F-PEC. The 
intermediate solutions for the two groups produced by fsQCA are summarized in Table 3. 
According to Ragin’s (2008a) suggestion, the presence of a condition is signified by a black 
circle, whereas the absence of a condition is signified by a while circle. Blank spaces denote a 
‘don’t care’ situation in which either presence or absence of a condition may not affect the 
outcome. To easily compare the causal configurations between these two groups, those 
configurations that are similar are labelled by the same number with different letters (for 
example, Path 1a vs. Path 1b).  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
Two types of measures assess the strength of configurations leading to the outcome. 
First, the consistency gauges the extent to which the cases share a given configuration leading 
to the outcome, and the coverage, like a coefficient of determination, indicates the extent to 
which the outcome is explained by a given configuration (Ragin, 2008a; Woodside, 2013). 
Second, unique coverage assesses the degree to which the outcome is covered solely by each 
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individual configuration (Ragin, 2008b). Table 3 shows that the consistency values for each 
configuration and overall solutions exceed .85, indicating that these configurations are 
sufficient recipes leading to high overall performance. Also, the overall solution coverage 
approximates to or exceeds .30, suggesting that these solutions can explain a certain 
proportion of high overall performance.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
To examine whether our findings are robust, we conducted another fsQCA analysis for 
objective profit growth. Table 4 displays the results and indicates that all of paths are the same 
with those for the overall performance measure for the low F-PEC firms. In terms of the high 
F-PEC firms, these paths are similar to those for the overall performance measure. Among 
others, the “don’t care” conditions are changed to the negation of conditions in terms of Path 
1b versus 1d and Path 2b versus 2d. This indicates that the absolute trade-offs between EO 
and exploration given a high level of exploitation. In sum, minor changes are observed but the 
interpretation remains unchanged. The results are similar between both outcomes, suggesting 
the validity and robustness of the results. 
 
Discussion 
Our research question inquired whether EO, exploration and exploitation form sufficient 
conditions of configurations for high performance among groups of family firms exhibiting 
high and low levels of family influence. Our analysis was motivated by the call of Miller and 
Le Breton-Miller (2006) who postulate that successful family firms are managing both 
exploration and exploitation, by Naldi et al. (2007) and Zellweger and Sieger (2012) who 
argue that EO is central to successful family firms, and by Miller et al. (2015) who argue that 
despite the apparent dysfunction possible when family influence is high, many of these family 
firms continue to perform well. We identified an important and relevant gap in the literature 
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that requires these elements to be brought together in one model. This gap is urgent to address 
because existing studies have almost exclusively relied on treating EO, exploration, 
exploitation and family influence as independent sets of explanatory variables in linear 
analyses. These analyses mask the complex interdependencies that exist among these factors, 
leading to faulty theory and misspecified implications for practice. We addressed this gap by 
investigating the configuration of these strategically-critical variables in family firms. We 
begin our discussion with general observations, before focusing on our propositions. 
As general findings, we identify multiple configurational paths to superior family firm 
performance. The only construct consistent across all paths is exploitation. Exploitation is 
therefore a key ingredient to family firm performance. Surprisingly, we find that EO is not a 
general driver of family firm performance, as it is an element in only one of the configurations 
(path 1b) and only then for those family firms that exhibit high family influence. The same is 
also found for exploration. Only in one path (2b) and solely for those family firms with high 
family influence does exploration drive performance. Also, exploration does not co-occur 
with EO suggesting that they are substitutes. Finally, because of these results, ambidexterity 
(the co-occurrence of exploration and exploitation within a specific configurational path) also 
occurs only once (path 2b) and for family firms exhibiting high family influence only. For 
family firms exhibiting low family influence, neither EO nor exploration matter for 
configurations of high performance (paths 1a and 2a) and in this instance, the results point to 
the absence or negation of EO and exploration as causal conditions. It seems then that family 
firms with low family influence create a set of conditions within themselves that negate the 
need for EO or exploration for high firm performance. Exploitation is always present, 
however. Finally, we find that the configurational paths are almost identical across subjective 
(Table 3) and objective (Table 4) measures of firm performance, providing us with a high 
level of confidence that our results are not sensitive to the form of performance measurement. 
The latter is important because studies of firm performance from a variety of management 
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perspectives using fsQCA are increasing rapidly (Aversa et al., 2015; Brenes et al., 2017; 
Kraus et al., 2017; Woodside et al., 2016). Scholars and managers need confidence that 
fsQCA results are robust across subjective and objective performance measures. We, 
therefore, offer a timely contribution to this endeavour that transcends our specific focus on 
family firms. 
For our propositions, Proposition 1 suspected that EO can be an element of family firm 
performance but is not a sufficient component on its own. We find evidence for this. EO is not 
sufficient on its own and it is not a particularly compelling ingredient in configurations of 
family firm performance either, playing no part in the configurational paths associated with 
high performance in family firms with low family influence, but playing a key role in one of 
the two paths for family firms exhibiting high family influence. An explanation might be that 
not all dimensions of EO are important or beneficial to family firms. For example, while 
family firm researchers have linked the three dimensions of EO individually and together to 
superior performance (Cruz and Nordquist, 2012; Naldi et al., 2007), scholars also report that 
the peculiarities of family influence can compromise EO by diminishing the appetite for risk-
taking, prioritizing the family’s financial and social well-being, and lead it to exhibit lower 
levels of certain dimensions of EO (Naldi et al., 2007), in part because of their desire to 
maintain and protect family control (Carney, 2005). Our findings align with this and provide 
an extension by suggesting that those family firms with high family influence require the 
whole of EO to offset the problems that excessive familiness causes. Yet, we cannot exclude 
the possibility that not all of the dimensions of EO are necessarily beneficial for family firms 
(Hughes and Morgan, 2007; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Zellweger and Sieger, 2012).  
For Proposition 2, we expected that exploration, exploitation or ambidexterity can be 
elements of family firm performance, but not a sufficient component on their own. This 
proposition again holds well for family firms with high family influence. This may suggest a 
latent bias in the theorization of ambidexterity in family firms that fails to account for 
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situations when family influence is not particularly present or prevalent. In path 2b, both 
exploration and exploitation are part of a high-performance configuration for high F-PEC 
firms. Ambidexterity is vital to these types of firms in one of their two configurational paths. 
We suggest that this reveals a local character to ambidexterity in which exploration is needed 
to offset the dysfunctional effects of high family influence. But, for low F-PEC firms, high 
performance can consist of solely exploitation, which goes against the final part of our 
proposition 2 that exploitation, exploration or ambidexterity are insufficient on their own. 
This is important for theory because it suggests that for these types of firms, specialization is 
better than ambidexterity. Gupta et al. (2006) questioned whether ambidexterity was 
inherently best for all firms, arguing that specialization in exploitation (or exploration) may 
yield higher gains, especially given March’s (1991) insistence that exploitation and 
exploration represent a trade-off due to their competing resource and organizational needs. 
O’Reilly and Tushman (2013) and Junni et al. (2013) also suggest that despite the supposed 
performance advantages of ambidexterity, it is not something that all firms can or should 
achieve, indicating a degree of context specificity. Our findings point to family firms and their 
degree of family influence as one such context, calling into question how theorizing about 
ambidexterity should treat family firms. 
We find support for Proposition 3 that EO, exploration, exploitation and ambidexterity 
form multiple configurations for the occurrence of family firm performance. There are indeed 
multiple configurations and these are robust across subjective and objective measures of 
family firm performance, being virtually identical and largely insensitive to the change in 
measure. Important in our results for Proposition 3, however, is that EO and exploration 
appear to be substitutes to each other for high F-PEC groups. This points to the local character 
of adaptation again. March (2006) insists that the survival of adaptive systems in 
environments that are changing and incompletely known requires firms to reproduce the 
attributes responsible for success (in this instance that appears to be exploitation given its 
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consistency across all paths) and generate sufficient variety to enable the firm to experiment 
with new opportunities. The latter according to March (2006) would require the firm to have 
exploration, but EO appears to be a substitute for that as both exploration and EO can create 
the requisite variety. This finding extends EO directly into the ambidexterity debate but also 
suggests that ambidexterity in a firm might be ‘hidden’ by another construct substituting for 
one of its core elements (in this case EO for exploration). This lends support to a theoretical 
argument originally seen in (Hughes et al. , 2007).  
Our expectations behind Proposition 4 receive support. Configurations of high family 
firm performance do differ between groups of low versus high family influence. This provides 
a first set of evidence to explain what Miller et al. (2015) referred to as the ‘Janus-face’ of 
socioemotional preferences in family firms. Some family firms strive to create strong 
businesses that can be passed to future generations, tending to be highly focused on 
innovative investment; others are excessively altruistic in which resources are 
misappropriated and strategic decisions become dysfunctional and distorted. The latter firms 
focus disproportionately on socioemotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2012) and are more likely 
to exhibit high F-PEC (Astrachan et al., 2002). Familiness can be positive (Miller et al., 
2015), but its attributes can undermine the innovation capacity of the family firm (Frank et al., 
2010), prioritising nepotistic appointments, rewarding undeserving kin and misappropriating 
firm assets to fulfil parochial desires (depleting resources for innovation) (Carney, 2005; De 
Massis et al., 2013b). These features explain why the configurational paths we find for those 
family firms with high family influence require either EO or exploration to offset those 
dysfunctional conditions. These findings advance our understanding of family firms by 
demonstrating the error inherent in relying on theory developed from independent sets of 
explanatory variables examined in linear analyses. These analyses do indeed mask the 
complex interdependencies that are likely to exist among EO, exploration, exploitation and 
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family influence and our findings refine currently-faulty theory as revealed through our 
propositions. 
Collectively, our findings point to an overlooked theoretical lens relevant to the study of 
family firms: adaptive theory (Baum and McKelviey, 1999; Campbell, 1985; March, 1991; 
March, 2006). In the family firm literature, agency theory and non-financial wealth 
considerations contained in the theory of socioemotional wealth stand out as the chief means 
to predict the behaviour and outcomes of family firms (Berrone et al., 2012; Carney, 2005; De 
Massis et al., 2013a). Greater family influence changes the circumstances and attributes 
within the firm—attributes that are responsible for success and must be replicated, but also 
attributes that are dysfunctional and require action to overcome. In our case, exploitation must 
be replicated but conditions to ensure variety generation (exploration) are relevant but only 
when family firms exhibit high familiness. Outside of that, EO appears to substitute for 
exploration and family firms with low familiness may already contain sufficient conditions 
for innovation (if March’s 2006 view is combined with theory of family firms). Thus, we 
reveal important conditions to understand and develop better predictions of family firm 
performance. 
To illustrate, greater familiness leads to greater desire to protect control with nepotistic 
appointments, misplaced altruism and misappropriation of assets. This has its roots in agency 
theory and socioemotional wealth, which suggests that greater familiness leads to greater 
control over strategic initiatives (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Carney, 2005; Shanker and 
Astrachan, 1996). Adaptive theory can help us understand this more from the point of view of 
attributes being replicated but also the local character of adaptation (i.e., it differs across 
high/low familiness). But adaptive theory is flawed on its own because greater familiness 
changes the meaning of success away from purely economic goals and towards a mix of 
economic and non-economic ones (Berrone et al., 2012). Thus, its usage in the study of family 
firms must account for their specific features. 
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At the outset of our paper, we argued that neglecting how critical factors might differ 
when placed in a configuration might lead to faulty theory and misspecified implications and 
we find support for this. Bringing together adaptive theory and existing lenses in family firm 
management research provides a better solution. We find different configurational routes to 
performance and these differ depending on the degree of familiness. Our study provides a 
basis to explain Miller et al.’s (2015) position that despite the apparent dysfunction caused by 
high familiness, successful examples of such family firms exist and we better understand both 
how and why this is the case. 
 
Implications 
Implications for family firm managers are apparent: family firms with low family influence 
benefit by specializing in exploitation and not ambidexterity; EO appears to substitute for 
exploration in configurations of high performance for family firms with high family 
influence; ambidexterity is present in one of the two configurations for high performance for 
family firms exhibiting high family influence while EO is present in the other (but neither are 
present in those for family firms with low family influence); and configurations of EO, 
exploration and exploitation are specific to the context, or local character, of the family firm 
and managers must configure their firm accordingly after an analysis of the presence and 
effects of family influence in their firm. EO is no silver bullet for family firm performance, 
and family managers should not blindly adopt an EO. It may be that other strategic 
orientations are more suitable (Altindag et al., 2011) and managerial emphasis on the more 
proximal and actionable success factors of, in particular exploitation, seems to be a more 
promising way towards a high degree of family firm performance.  
These implications are tempered by our study limitations. First, our variables refer to 
the same point in time, which does not allow us to infer causality, though we hasten to add 
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that this is not the purpose of fsQCA. fsQCA ascertains whether several plausible 
configurations associated with an outcome variable of interest can be observed, breaking the 
restrains of traditional regression analyses which depend on identifying individual effects of 
independent variables on a dependent variable. Second, research needs to scrutinize whether 
the results can be transferred to other contexts beyond our sample. Third, researchers may 
have some leeway in how to implement fsQCA. As fsQCA is still nascent in the different 
fields of management research, there is no critical mass of studies to be used as reference 
points for the consistent choice of cross-over points and membership-criteria. Different cross-
over points might generate different conclusions and thus a sophisticated approach to set 
calibration is needed in which the calibration process is properly described and disclosed 
(Garcia-Castro and Casasola, 2011; Mendel and Korjani, 2012). This would further facilitate 
the comparison between different empirical fsQCA assessments to improve understanding 
and enrich the quality of theory building. Fourth, we were unable to return to our respondents 
to collect qualitative evidence about the ways our factors interact within each configuration. 
Interesting questions for future research include a finer examination of the implications 
of adaptive theory for family firm performance, EO and ambidexterity. We find that family 
firms with low family influence can benefit from specializing in exploitation only, but this 
may jeopardise longer term success if exploration is not provided through some other means. 
Examining EO and ambidexterity across time or within family firms of different ages or 
periods of next-generation succession may reveal further important information. Having 
empirically identified configurations of high-performing family firms, and begun to speculate 
about their internal consistency, we invite future research to further explore the processes that 
link EO, exploration, exploitation, and family influence to superior family firm performance. 
This way, the field can move to mid-range theories of family firm performance and 
practitioners will learn about the sequence of implementing management practices. 
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Figure 3 
Formula to calculate objective profit growth rate 
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Table 1 
Sample characteristics 
Characteristic  Sample Sample 
population 
Percentage of 
shares owned by 
family members 
51% to 75% 
76% to 100% 
10.1% 
89.9% 
 
Size of firms Micro business = 10 employees or less 20.2% 24.7% 
(employees) Small business = Between 10 and 50 
employees 
38.8% 38.8% 
 Medium business = Between 51 and 250 
employees 
36.4% 26.4% 
 Large business = Above 250 employees 4.6% 10.1% 
Industry Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1.6% 2.0% 
 Manufacturing 40.3% 27.4% 
 Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning 
supply 2.3% 1.8% 
 Building and construction 5.4% 5.5% 
 Wholesale and retail trade 27.1% 29.6% 
 Transportation and storage 3.9% 4.4% 
 Accommodation and food service activities 2.3% 3.3% 
 Information and communication activities 1.6% 2.4% 
 Financial and insurance activities 0.8% 4.8% 
 Real estate activities 2.3% 2.9% 
 Administrative and support service 
activities 3.1% 4.4% 
 Human health and social work activities 0.8% 1.1% 
 Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.8% 1.1% 
 Other service activities 7.8% 9.3% 
Legal form Private limited liability company 96.1% 96.3% 
 Public limited liability company 3.9% 3.7% 
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Table 2 
Truth table 
EO Exploration Exploitation 
Number  
of cases 
Raw 
 consistency 
PRI 
 consistency 
Low F-PEC group (n=65) a 
High High High 60 0.92  0.89  
High Low High 1 0.97  0.89  
Low High High 1 0.98  0.90  
Low Low High 1 0.98  0.88  
High High Low 0 
  High Low Low 0 
  Low High Low 0 
  Low Low Low 0 
   High F-PEC group (n=64) 
High High High 61 0.91  0.87  
Low High High 2 0.95  0.83  
High Low High 1 0.97  0.91  
High High Low 0 
  High Low Low 0 
  Low High Low 0 
  Low Low High 0 
  Low Low Low 0 
  a Two cases with a membership of 0.50 in causal conditions or outcome were excluded from 
the truth table. 
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Table 3 
The causal configurations for the overall performance a  
 Low F-PEC group (n=65) High F-PEC group (n=64) 
 Path 1a Path 2a Path 1b Path 2b 
Entrepreneurial orientation ○  ●  
Exploration  ○  ● 
Exploitation ● ● ● ● 
Raw coverage .26 .25 .92 .92 
Unique coverage .05 .04 .03 .02 
Consistency .97 .96 .90 .88 
Solution coverage .30 .94 
Solution consistency .95 .87 
Notes: Black circles “●” indicate the presence of causal conditions (i.e., antecedents). White 
circles “○” indicate the absence or negation of causal conditions. The blank cells represent 
“don’t care” conditions. 
a Overall performance was measured on sales growth, profit growth, and market share growth. 
 
Table 4 
The causal configurations for the objective profit growth 
 Low F-PEC group (n=65) High F-PEC group (n=64) 
 Path 1c Path 2c Path 1d Path 2d 
Entrepreneurial orientation ○  ● ○ 
Exploration  ○ ○ ● 
Exploitation ● ● ● ● 
Raw coverage .38 .36 .37 .40 
Unique coverage .08 .06 .06 .09 
Consistency .93 .92 .86 .87 
Solution coverage .44 .46 
Solution consistency .93 .84 
Notes: Black circles “●” indicate the presence of causal conditions (i.e., antecedents). White 
circles “○” indicate the absence or negation of causal conditions. The blank cells represent 
“don’t care” conditions. 
 
 
 
 
